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AUTOCHTHONOUS CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN
POST-COLONIAL SINGAPORE: INTIMATIONS OF
CONFUCIANISM AND THE LEVIATHAN IN
ENTRENCHING DOMINANT GOVERNMENT
Eugene K.B. Tan*
ABSTRACT
Does Singapore's approach to institutional design vis-a-
vis political representation prioritize strong and effective
government, or is the goal one that is geared towards a
representative government as a means of enhancing
political governance? his paper examines the series of
amendments to Singapore's Constitution and related
legislation, between 1984 and 1990, and in 2010, which
relate to political representation in Singapore's electoral
system and unicameral legislature. At one level, the
changes are part of the endeavor to retain Parliament's
standing as the focal point of Singapore's Westminster-
modeled system of government. The constitutional
changes reflect the political elites' abiding belief that
institutional design must produce a government with a
clear mandate, demonstrated through a strong
parliamentary majority, for it to govern resolutely and
decisively in the long-term interests of Singapore.
However, even as the changes are presented as a public
interest endeavor to enhance Parliament's
representativeness, the legislative changes marginalize
the importance of representation in Singapore's
parliamentary democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the spread of democratization globally, there is a clarion
call for more representative government in many emerging
democracies. The growing consensus argues that the institutional
design of political and economic institutions is critical to a
country's economic success and failure. For example, Daron
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argue that politics and political
institutions determine a country's economic institutions (e.g.
inclusive or extractive).' In this regard, electoral system reforms
and innovation have played, and continue to play, a critical role in
responding to popular democratic aspirations, in establishing and
entrenching good governance, and in developing institutions,
processes and norms of government that cater to a country's
specific needs and conditions. Much faith has been placed in
electoral reforms to tackle the concerns of the democratic deficit. 2
For instance, Pippa Norris observes that electoral systems
"represent, perhaps, the most powerful instrument available for
institutional engineering, with far reaching consequences for party
systems, the composition of legislatures, and the durability of
democratic arrangements."3
For multi-racial societies, in particular, several similar strands
of thought have gained ascendency. These include Arend
Lijphart's seminal theory of consociation or power-sharing, the
suitability of maj oritarian vis-a-vis proportional representation
1 Acemoglu and Robinson's take-away, bluntly put, is that to get a country's
economics right, get the politics right first. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A.
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND
POVERTY (2012).
2The concept of democratic deficit refers to a situation in which governmental or
public bodies/institutions of a country or an organization (e.g., the European
Union) are perceived to suffer from a lack of democracy and are regarded as
being inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. It reflects the gap between the
perceived democratic performance of the entity and public expectations.
Various reasons have been offered for a democratic deficit such as poor
institutional design or inadequacy of processes, inability to meet the demand (in
which there is popular expectation of more), availability of information beyond
official sources (negative news about government and access to alternative
sources of news and information), and supply side issues (e.g., the performance
and structure of democratic regimes). Democratic deficits often reflect the
dynamics of the democratization process.
3 PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING: VOTING RULES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 209 (2004).
Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY,
no. 2, at 96 (2004); AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A
COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977).
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systems, and electoral systems' ability to generate mass support
for the political system, especially from minorities. ' Not
surprisingly, greater weight is now placed on the pivotal role of
elections and political institutions in divided societies as a
necessary way station in the development of a stable and inclusive
political process of representation.
This article seeks to examine Singapore's approach to
institutional design of its electoral and political system.7 It also
examines whether political representation ultimately prioritizes a
strong and effective government over a representative one. It
examines the various changes to the Singapore Constitution that
relate to institutional design since 1984, including the latest set of
amendments in 2010. At one level, the constitutional and
legislative changes are part of the larger endeavor to retain
Parliament's standing as the focal point of Singapore's
Westminster-modeled system of government. The key challenge
revolves around keeping parliamentary democracy relevant in a
one-party dominant political system. Intimately connected to this
is the ruling People's Action Party's (PAP) steadfast belief that
political contestation must be 'constructive' and that this must take
place in the political arena primarily through the electoral process.
The 2010 constitutional changes reflect and reinforce the
political elites' abiding belief since the 1980s that institutional
design must produce a government with a clear mandate,
demonstrated through a strong parliamentary majority, for it to
govern resolutely and decisively in the long-term interests of
Singapore. Through the years, the government's overarching
narrative on institutional design and change has presented the
constitutional changes and innovations as a public interest
endeavor to enhance Parliament's representativeness and to
Norris, supra note 3, at 209-229.
6 E.g. Allen Hicken & Yuko Kasuya, A Guide to the Constitutional Structures
and Electoral Systems of East, South, and Southeast Asia, 22 ELECTORAL
STUDIES, no. 1, at 121 (2003); Stefan Wolff, The Electoral Dynamics of
Elections (European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI) Working Paper 17,
2003), available at http://www.ecmi.de/publications/detail/17-the-ethnopoli
tical-dynamics-of-elections-179/; TE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY (Andrew
Reynolds ed., 2002); BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES:
ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (2001).
Due to space constraints, this article focuses on the changes to the electoral and
legislative system. It does not examine the creation of the elected President
office, which is probably the most significant change to the Singapore
Constitution to date.
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increase Singaporeans' civic participation and democratic
ownership of governmental processes. However, the changes and
innovations continue to marginalize representation and fairness in
Singapore's parliamentary democracy. The election and
appointment of Singapore's legislators to date suggest that
representative democracy is not a prioritized outcome of the
electoral system. The ruling People's Action Party's political
dominance notwithstanding, the pressure is on the evolving
institutional design to become more inclusive, representative,
equitable and fair, in tandem with the growing democratic
aspirations.
The article is organized as follows. Part II outlines the
contextual setting of the People's Action Party's political
dominance in Singapore. In Part III, the ideational impulses of
preemptive constitutional design, the reliance on the longue durde
for political legitimation, and the concern with harmony and
stability are sketched as the backdrop to some of the driving forces
of institutional design. Part IV examines the constitutional
innovations to the electoral and legislative systems introduced in a
heightened period of constitutional engineering between 1984 and
1991. The motivations for institutional design are examined in
Part V. Part VI concludes the paper.
II. CONTEXT: LONGEVITY OF
ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE
The constitutional changes to the electoral and political
system since 1984 have to be contextualized against the backdrop
of the post-independence evolution of Singapore's legislature in a
one-party dominant state. 8 A dominant theme in Singapore's
political evolution is the shift towards Parliament being
reconceptualized and reaffirmed as the national platform for
alternative and diverse voices, rather than just adversarial, partisan
ones. Expressions of political disagreement and opposition should
be constructive, and not strident. Harmony is preferred over
discord and division. The ruling elites' deep reservations with
disharmony, discord and dissent, particularly in civil society and
8 See also the discussion in Li-ann Thio, The Post Colonial Evolution of the
Singapore Legislature: A Case Study, Sing. J. Legal Stud. 80 (1993).
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in cyberspace, take place amid a growing desire among
Singaporeans for a more open and vibrant political system.
Since 9 August 1965, Singapore has been a sovereign
republic with a Westminster-modeled parliamentary system of
government. The separation of powers among the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary is provided in Singapore's
Constitution. Singapore's parliamentary election system is
modeled on the British electoral plurality system although there
have been significant modifications. 9 With relatively handsome
but declining victory margins, the PAP has won all eleven post-
independence general elections. This has enabled the PAP
government to implement constitutional and legal changes with
relative swiftness and ease. Between 1968 and 1981, it was the
only party in the unicameral Parliament. Since then, the PAP has
consistently garnered at least 93 per cent of all elected
parliamentary seats at every general election. Due to its enduring
political dominance, the PAP government has been likened to a
post-colonial Leviathano or a civil oligarch." As Table 1 shows,
the PAP has a disproportionate share of parliamentary seats vis-a-
vis its share of popular votes.
Despite a large middle-class, relative affluence, and growing
but unbalanced electoral competition in Singapore, the PAP's
political dominance is likely to persist into the foreseeable future.
9 Hans-Christoph Rieger, Singapore, in 2 ELECTIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: A
DATE HANDBOOK 239-61 (Dieter Nohlen et al. eds., 2001); Can Seng Ooi,
Singapore, in 1 POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 343-402 (Wolfgang Sachsenr6der & Ulrike
Elisabeth Frings eds., 1998). For instance, Singapore's head of state is the
President, elected by popular mandate since 1993, who exercises essentially
reactionary custodial powers and ceremonial duties. The creation of the elected
Presidency in 1990 was the culmination of constitutional engineering in the
1980s. For more on the elected Presidency, see collection of essays in
MANAGING POLITICAL CHANGE IN SINGAPORE: TE ELECTED PRESIDENCY
(Kevin Tan & Lam Peng Er eds., 1997).
10 DAN SLATER, ORDERING POWER: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND AUTHORITARIAN
LEVIATHANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (2010). Dan Slater views the PAP government
as a Leviathan through its use of coercive and remunerative powers. Thomas
Hobbes' Leviathan, published in 1651, has shaped Western political thinking.
For society's self-preservation and protection from anarchy, Hobbes argued that
a leader and protector, whose position is governed by a contract with the people,
is needed. The PAP govermment sees itself in a similar light as a leader and
protector, operating within a social compact which governs the relationship
between the government and the governed. For one perspective of Singapore's
social compact, see Eugene K.B. Tan, The Evolving Social compact and the
Transformation of Singapore: Going Beyond Quid Pro Quo in Governance, in
MANAGEMENT OF SUCCESS: SINGAPORE REVISITED (Terence Chong ed., 2010).
This is the term used in JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY (2011).
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This political dominance arises from a variety of factors including
the structural and self-inflicted impoverishment of the opposition,
the opposition's inability to present a united front and to convince
the electorate that it can form a viable political alternative, and the
configuration of the political system that makes effective political
competition difficult.12
Until the 2011 general elections ushered in a so-called 'new
normal' political landscape in Singapore, 3 parliamentary elections
were one-sided and effectively a limited referendum of sorts on
the PAP's performance and legitimacy. 4 In addition, the PAP is
"adept at changing the electoral rules to its advantage" in the
electoral process. 1 The PAP government has rejected repeated
calls for the establishment of an independent electoral
* * 16
commission.
12 Suzaina Kadir, Singapore: Engagement and Autonomy within the Political
Status Quo, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN ASIA: EXPANDING AND
CONTRACTING DEMOCRATIC SPACE 324-54 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2004);
HuSSIN MUTALIB, PARTIES AND POLITICS: A STUDY OF OPPOSITION PARTIES AND
THE PAP IN SINGAPORE (2003); DIANE K. MAUZY & R.S. MWNE, SINGAPORE
POLITICS UNDER THE PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (2002); James V. Jesudason, The
Resilience of One-Party Dominance in Malaysia and Singapore, in THE
AWKWARD EMBRACE: ONE-PARTY DOMINATION AND DEMOCRACY 127-72
(Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins eds., 1999); Heng Chee Chan, The Role
of Parliamentary Politicians in Singapore, 1 LEGIS. STUD. Q., no. 3, at 423
13 (1976).
For various analysis of the 2011 general election, see VOTING IN CHANGE:
POLITICS OF SINGAPORE'S 2011 GENERAL ELECTION (Kevin Y.L. Tan & Terence
Lee eds., 2011); CATHERINE LIM, A WATERSHED ELECTION: SINGAPORE'S GE
2011 (2011); DEREK DA CUNHA, BREAKTHROUGH: ROADMAP FOR SINGAPORE'S
POLITICAL FUTURE (2012).
14 Mauzy, supra note 12; Garry Rodan, Elections without Representation: The
Singapore Experience under the PAP, in THE POLITICS OF ELECTIONS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA 61-89 (R.H. Taylor ed., 1996).
1 Allen Hicken, Asia and the Pacific: General Overview, in HANDBOOK OF
ELECTORAL SYSTEM CHOICE 459 (Josep M. Colmer ed., 2004).
16 The Elections Department is under the Prime Minister's Office, http://www.
elections.gov.sg/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
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Table 1: PAP's Post-Independence Electoral Performance, 1968 - 2011
Date of ITotail No, of T otal No. of ["A P',", 0 Sh1are PAP's Share of'
Genel Prila1 1menl:itaty Parl[imentaiy Seats11 of I til VaIlid acam
Elction St Contested by\ PAP Vots, Cas Sat (Only ("'
13 Apr 1968 58 51 (87.9) 86.7 58 (100)
2 Sep 1972 65 8 (12.3) 70.4 65 (100)
23 Dec 1976 69 16 (23.2) 74.1 69 (100)
23 Dec 1980 75 37 (49.3) 77.7 75 (100)
22 Dec 1984 79 30 (39.8) 64.8 77 (97.5)
3 Sep 1988 81 11 (13.6) 63.2 80 (98.8)
31 Aug1991 81 41 (50.6) 61.0 77 (95.1)
2 Jan 1997 83 47 (56.6) 65.0 81 (97.6)
3 Nov 2001 84 55 (64.7) 75.3 82 (97.6)
6 May 2006 84 37 (44.05) 66.6 82 (97.6)
7 May 2011 87 5 (5.75) 60.1 81 (93.1)
Source: Author's compilation based on information available at the website of
the Singapore Elections Department
The inherited common law legal system is a legacy of
Singapore's British colonial past, which began when Stamford
Raffles of the British East India Company founded Singapore in
1819 with the goal of turning it into an entrep6t at the crossroads
of East and West, and between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The
development of an autochthonous political and legal system is a
more recent phenomenon, gaining traction from the last decade of
the twentieth century.' 7 Indeed, the confidence that accompanied
successful state-building bred further confidence and the belief
that Western political models and ideologies are not entirely
appropriate for Singapore's nation-building. State-building in
Singapore is nominally built on established institutional templates
of democracy derived from other parts of the world. In fact,
nation-building is indigenously developed and jealously protected
from external influence.' 8
17 ANDREW PHANG BOON LEONG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINGAPORE LAW:
HISTORICAL AND Socio-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1990).
This likens state-building to the development of 'hardware' such as institutions
(e.g., the public service, courts) and their strength and institutional capacity.
Nation-building is equated with the development of 'software' (or 'heartware'
so to speak), such as the inculcation of values, norms, and political beliefs
necessary to engender a sense of belonging and common purpose in a nation-
state.
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Hewed as it was from the established Westminster system of
parliamentary democracy, Singapore's parliamentary system today
maintains but trappings of its colonial legacy. Even though the
Westminster heritage is often cited, the adaptation of political
institutions and processes is seen as being necessary for
Singapore's political survival and prosperity. There is no
sentimental attachment to its Westminster roots. This dovetails
with the abiding belief in the 'Singapore way': a model of
development that is coterminous with her history, societal values,
and development objectives, in contradistinction to prevailing
Western norms.19
Since the mid-1980s there has been a deliberate effort at post-
colonial 'constitutional engineering' in Singapore. In the evolving
constitutional architecture, the core intent of these efforts is to
design a political system that can reduce the incidence and
severity of 'political accidents' such as a 'freak' election outcome,
in which the PAP is not returned to power. 2 0 This impetus in
constitutional design entails that such concerns relating to the
political system are dealt with preemptively wherever possible.
Specific concerns relating to Singapore include the lack of
minority representation, the lack of opposition representation (and
voices) in Parliament, the lack of adequate checks and balances
should a 'rogue government' be in power, and catering to the
desire for a more diverse and competitive political landscape.
19 See, e.g., Bilahari Kausikan, Governance That Works, 8 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 2,
at 24, 27 (1997) for a robust defense of the view that "there cannot be a
'Singapore model' that is applicable anywhere but in Singapore."
This theme of 'freak election results' was a constant refrain of Singapore's first
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in the 1980s. The theme was repeated by Lee's
successor, Goh Chok Tong in the 1990s, during which significant constitutional
changes first conceived under Lee were implemented and tested during Goh's
tenure as Prime Minister (1990-2004). See also Li-ann Thio, The Passage of a
Generation: Revisiting the Report of the 1966 Constitutional Commission, in
EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION
7-49 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin YL Tan eds., 2009); Mutalib Hussin, Singapore 's
First Elected Presidency: The Political Motivations, in MANAGING POLITICAL
CHANGE IN SINGAPORE: TE ELECTED PRESIDENCY 167-87 (Kevin YL Tan &
Lam Peng Er eds., 1997).
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III. 'PREEMPTIVE' CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, THE
LONGUE DUREE, AND THE HARMONY IDEOLOGY
The mid-1980s to 1991 marked an intense period of
constitutional engineering during which the Constitution was
substantially amended. This period of constitutional innovation
was preceded and accompanied by the PAP's less than impressive
electoral victories in the three general elections of 1984, 1988 and
1991. In these general elections, the PAP did not maintain their
dominance (as they did in the 1968, 1972, 1976 and 1980 editions).
It garnered slightly less than two-thirds of the total valid votes cast
(see Table 1). By the PAP's own high standards, its electoral
performance in 1984, 1988, and 1991 were relatively poor. This
was notwithstanding the fact that the PAP had delivered the
economic goods and Singaporeans' income grew significantly
during the twenty years between independence in 1965 and 1984.
The last few years of the 1980s also witnessed preparations for
Singapore's first political leadership handover from Lee Kuan
Yew to Goh Chok Tong in 1990, and a controversial national
security clampdown against alleged Marxist conspirators in 1987
and 1988.
The PAP government recognized that Singaporeans, while
confident of PAP's economic governance, were less enamored of
its political dominance. To arrest this gradual weakening of
electoral popularity, the PAP introduced various constitutional
innovations. At one level, these innovations could be regarded as
part of the overarching effort in preemptive constitutional design
to cater to the perceived flaws and inadequacies of the imported
Westminster form of government for Singapore. These
innovations were ostensibly not only aimed at tackling the various
concerns the government had with democratic development, but at
evolving a distinctive political and electoral system that was
deemed appropriate for an exceptional sovereign city-state. At
another level, the innovations were perceived by the government's
critics as disingenuous efforts to tilt the political playing field to
the PAP's advantage. The PAP's government's overarching
concern in promoting its conception of governance and
institutional design was how to entrench its political dominance.
The government's desire not to be fettered by its Westminster
heritage was evident even as the claim to its colonial Westminster
origins was instrumentally relied upon whenever it was useful to
assert such a longue durde. The modem nation-state, as Benedict
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Anderson suggests, tends to project its history back to a
geographic and cultural entity with a long past so as to derive
some dimension of heritage, legitimacy and standing bom of the
longue durde.21 In Singapore, this strategic narrative of a political
longue durde reflects an inchoate dialogue between the imported
Westminster traditions and conventions, and the particularistic
imperative of contextualizing and modernizing political
institutions to fit the demands and aspirations of political
modernity and sovereignty.
Yet, while asserting its Westminster roots, the Singaporean
quest for political modernity has its unevenness and its
contradictions. In its restless search for a veritable political past
and heritage, the quest for a longue durde was not only confined to
tracing its lineage to that of its colonial master. Singapore has
incorporated selected facets of the ancient Chinese political
philosophy of Confucianism, as well as the republican endeavors
of the founder of republican China, Sun Yat-sen, into its otherwise
brief political historiography. 2 2 This aspect of (re-)defining the
national past requires the various tools of nurturing nationalism
including inventing traditions, creating national myths and
national heroes, and revising the national historiography. 23
Given the particularistic neo-Confucian political culture
subtly promoted by the Singaporean government, the political
leadership subscribes to the Confucian precept that leaders have a
moral duty to act in the collective interest. It is from this that they
derive their moral authority to govem even as the legal and
political authority to govern comes from the electoral mandate.24
21 BENEDICT R. O'G ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991).
22 Eugene K.B. Tan, Re-engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural
Imperatives ofNation-building in Singapore, 175 CHINA Q. 751 (2003).
23 See TE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds.,
1983).
24 Singapore's founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argues that good
government is what people want and that cultural values a la 'Asian Values'
play a determinant role in deciding the political norms of a society:
"What Asians value may not necessarily be what Americans or
Europeans value. Westerners value the freedoms and liberties of the
individual. As an Asian of Chinese cultural background, my values
are for a government which is honest, effective and efficient in
protecting its people, and allowing opportunities for all to advance
themselves in a stable and orderly society, where they can live a
good life and raise their children to do better than themselves...
Very few democratically elected governments in the Third World
uphold these values. But it is what their people want... It is Asian
values that have enabled Singapore to contain its drug problem."
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This system of government is presumed to be virtuous and to be
trusted. As such, a government of good men (and women) should
not be subjected to the pervasive scrutiny and suspicion that
political leaders in liberal democracies face. To do so would
undermine the integrity of the political system and render political
governance more challenging since the government's focus would
be diffused. This imperils the common good. To reinforce its
approach to governance, the PAP government gave its self-
interested imprimatur to the Confucian notion of good government
by good men, incorporating it as a cornerstone of Singapore's
political governance philosophy. Thus, the Shared Values White
Paper affirmed:
The concept of government by honourable men (junzi)
who have a duty to do right for the people, and who
have the trust and respect of the population, fits us
better than the Western idea that a government should
be given as limited powers as possible, and should
always be treated with suspicion unless proven
otherwise.25
In this scheme of things, the junzi ( f, Confucian
gentleman)26 and li (4, proper behavior in sync with societal
order and norms through moral propriety) are dominant themes,
resonating with the political elites in Singapore.27
Daniel A. Bell observes that Singapore's political
meritocracy is based on the assumption that political leaders have
a better sense of the community's interest than the average
citizen. 28 This coupled with the need for Singapore's political
leaders to be trained over several electoral cycles means that
See FOOK KWANG HAN ET AL., LEE KUAN YEW: TE MAN AND HIS IDEAS 380
(1998).
25 SHARED VALUES (Cmd. I of 1991) at 8, para. 41.
For an elaboration of the classical understanding of the Confucian junzi, see
WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE TROUBLE WITH CONFUCIANISM 24-45 (1991).
27 On the compatibility of Confucianism and human rights, and that
'Confucianism values' are universal values too, see Louis Henkin,
Confucianism, Human Rights and 'Cultural Relativism, 'in CONFUCIANISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 1-20 (1998). See also DOH CHULL SHIN, CONFUCIANISM AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN EAST ASIA (2012).
28 Daniel A. Bell, Introduction: The Theory, History, and Practice of Political
Meritocracy, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL
MERITOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19 (Daniel A. Bell & Chenyang
Li eds., 2013).
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"meritocracy is incompatible with multiparty rule and the
possibility that it would lead to alteration of political power."
Hence, the apparent exceptionalism of Singapore becomes the
watchword to explain away the inherent contradiction manifested
through the overlaying of a one-party dominant system on a liberal
democratic political system inherited from the British.29
Allied with the theme of political leaders who serve the larger
good is the essentialist approach towards culture through its
insistence on the need to maintain the Asian way of life in the face
of enervating Westernization. Culture is relied upon to revive the
values of consensus and harmony intrinsic to the system of values
and traditions of Singaporeans of various races.30 The endeavor to
reinvigorate harmony (T1) as a desired and indigenous socio-
cultural norm and value needs to be seen in the context of the
political ethos and economic pragmatism nurtured by the state.
The interplay of culture, institutional design in governance and the
promotion of ideational norms and aspirations reflect the way
Singapore has sought to promote political governance.
In seeking consensus and stability, harmony is instrumentally
utilized as both a means and an end in political governance. 3 1 This
coheres with Francis Fukuyama's observation that stability and
respect for authority as ideal conceptions of governance
necessarily consign disagreement, contention, and conflict as
problematic or even illicit.3 2 Enshrined as part of the national
Shared Values, 33 the Singaporean ideology of consensus and
29 For a discussion of Singapore's political meritocracy, see Benjamin Wong,
Political Meritocracy in Singapore: Lessons from the PAP Government, in THE
EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL MERITOCRACY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 288-313 (Daniel A. Bell & Chenyang Li eds.,
2013); Kenneth Paul Tan, Meritocracy and Political Liberalization in
Singapore, in TE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL
MERITOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 314-339 (Daniel A. Bell &
Chenyang Li eds., 2013). Wong discusses the rigorous and systematic mode of
selection by which Singapore's top echelon of political leaders are identified
and groomed for public office.
Eugene K.B. Tan, Harmony as Ideology, Culture, and Control: Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Singapore, 9 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L., no. 1, at 120 (2007).
31 On harmony as an organizing concept in governance and in Confucian thought,
see JULIA TAO ET AL., GOVERNANCE FOR HARMONY IN ASIA AND BEYOND (2010).
32 Francis Fukuyama, The Primacy of Culture, 6 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 1, at 7
(1995). Daniel A. Bell reminds us that harmony is "the idea that social relations
characterized by peaceful order and respect for diversity are essential.": See
Daniel A. Bell, Why We Must Measure National Harmony, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2013.
33 Singapore's Shared Values, adopted by the Parliament of Singapore on Jan. 15,
1991, are:
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harmony provides a suitable ideational substratum to reinforce the
social discipline that is cherished and consciously inculcated by
the state in Singaporean society. As a political resource, the
propagation of communitarianism, and the harmony ideology and
culture can be leveraged upon discursively to disarm any potential
political or social change movement, especially those favoring the
pursuit of individual rights over community interests, of which the
state is seen as the ultimate protector.
IV. SYMBOLIC OPPOSITION AND THE VALORISING
OF ALTERNATIVE VOICES
A. NoN-CONSTITUENCY AND NOMINATED
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
Introduced in 1984 and 1990 respectively, the innovations of
the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) and the
Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) schemes derive their
currency from the political intent of maintaining Parliament's
relevance in a one-party dominant system. By then, the PAP
government recognized the need to ensure a nominal, if not
minimum, representation of opposition parliamentarians. In
essence, the NCMP and NMP schemes were designed to produce a
legislature that would include non-government MPs. Rather than
substantially deepening democratic tendencies, the flurry of
innovations to Singapore's democratic institutions superficially
address the electorate's desire for alternative voices in Parliament
without liberalizing the political system.
This attempt to introduce non-PAP MPs, albeit unelected,
was to ensure that Parliament would not be perceived as a de facto
PAP party caucus. In turn, this can help reduce the perception that
Parliament, as the legislative body, was but a mere rubber stamp
of law-making, budgetary and policy initiatives of the dominant
Executive (the Cabinet).3 4 It also sought to assure the Singaporean
* Nation before community and society above self
* Family as the basic unit of society
* Community support and respect for the individual
* Consensus, not conflict
* Racial and religious harmony.
Ross WORTHINGTON, GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE 63-105 (2003). Worthington
sees the Singapore legislature as being peripheral to policy-making. Similarly,
PERC (Political & Economic Risk Consultancy) in its Asian Intelligence report
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electorate that it should vote in its self-interest and not be overly
concerned with Parliament being dominated by the PAP, since
there will be a guaranteed minimum number of non-PAP MPs. 35
Thus, the NCMP scheme would ensure that Parliament has a
minimum number of legislators outside the ruling party (i.e., the
PAP). In its original form, the NCMPs were selected from the
best-performing opposition candidates who did not win seats in
the general election and had secured at least 15 per cent of the vote
among their respective constituencies. The opposition, not
surprisingly, strongly opposed the NCMP scheme regarding it as
an attempt to dissuade voters from recognizing the importance of
electing opposition MPs. Given the objection to the NCMP
scheme, opposition parties initially opted not to accept the NCMP
seats when offered. Instead of expanding the NCMP scheme, the
government introduced another constitutional innovation in 1990 -
the NMP scheme. This was not surprising. The NMP innovation
not only marked the effort to have more non-government voices in
Parliament but also flagged the clear preference for 'alternative' or
non-partisan voices, rather than 'opposition' or partisan voices.
The accent on consensus and alternative voices, rather than
contestation and opposition voices, is evident and reflects
accurately the constitutional intent. Like their NCMP counterparts,
the NMPs are unelected representatives. They are selected by a
special Select Committee of Parliament and recommended for
appointment by the elected President.3 6 Hence, the NMPs (more
of Feb. 20, 2013, "PERC's Ranking of National Legislatures in Asia," observes
in the Singapore case the "very strong executive decisions that the legislature
has endorsed - often without a great deal of debate." Cf KHAI LEONG Ho,
SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES, UNSHARED POWER: THE POLITICS OF POLICY-
MAKING IN SINGAPORE 170-215 (Rev. & expanded ed. 2003), who notes the
MPs' legitimation role in public policy making. See also Chan, supra note 12.
35 Party, government, and the state are often conflated in the Singapore context.
This is not surprising given the PAP's dominance since 1959 when it first
formed the govermnent after Singapore attained self-government from the
British. At another level, the PAP elites often conflate voter interest with that of
the PAP's self-interest, which is, in turn, conflated with that of the state's
interest.
36 In selecting applicants for appointment as NMPs, Section 3(2) of the Fourth
Schedule of the Constitution provides that NMPs "shall be persons who have
rendered distinguished public service, or who have brought honor to the
Republic, or who have distinguished themselves in the field of arts and letters,
culture, the sciences, business, industry, the professions, social or community
service or the labor movement...." The provision further provides that the
Special Select Committee, in making any nomination, "shall have regard to the
need for nominated Members to reflect as wide a range of independent and
non-partisan views as possible."
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than the NCMPs) lack the requisite authenticity and authority to
represent any group including the functional groups that they may
come from and from which they may have secured endorsements
for their applications.
As NCMPs and NMPs are not elected legislators, their
legislative powers are also limited. Article 39(2) of the
Constitution stipulates that NCMPs and NMPs are not to vote in
Parliament on (i) any Bill that seeks to amend the Constitution; (ii)
a Supply Bill, Supplementary Supply Bill or Final Supply Bill; (iii)
a Money Bill; 37 (iv) a measure of no confidence in the
Government; and (v) removing the President from office.38
Initially, the Constitution provided for up to six NMPs. In 1997,
the Constitution was amended to provide for a maximum of nine
NMPs. '9 This constitutional amendment indicated the greater
utility of the NMP scheme to the PAP government while also
signaling a political preference that the legislature is not about
strident, opposing voices but rather about constructive and
alternative voices. This perspective of Parliament, as one
characterized by consensus instead of contention, is in keeping
with the harmony philosophy that is encouraged by the PAP
government. It was argued that NMPs could make the legislative
debates "more representative" by providing "an intermediate range
of opinions," which MPs with political party affiliations could not
offer. 40 These inputs would promote the legislative process
through broadening political participation and enhancing
consensus building. The praise for the NMP scheme can be
contrasted with the seeming lack of attention to the NCMP scheme.
There was little incentive to enhance the NCMP scheme in the
same manner as the NMP scheme. One incisive critique of the
NCMP and NMP schemes is that they are regarded
as placating the electorate's desire for a genuine
opposition by guaranteeing an opposition presence,
though in token numbers, with inferior powers and
lacking an electoral mandate.... These changes do not
impede strong government or effect any real changes in
power, while mitigating the 'one party state' image and
37 As defined in Article 68 of the Singapore Constitution.
38 As provided for under Article 22L of the Singapore Constitution.
39 Only two NMPs were appointed in the first batch during 1990.
40 54 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, Col. 701 (Nov. 29, 1989) per Deputy
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong.
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the unsavory images of intolerance and absolutism this
evokes.
The preemptive nature of these constitutional innovations
was evident even as the notion of representation was subtly relied
upon to add legitimacy. More importantly, they sought to keep
pace with and manage the desire for more non-government voices
in the legislature by regulating it. This was preferred to allowing
the opposition to develop and grow organically in a more
competitive political setting. Further, the pre-emptive approach to
institutional design meant that the PAP government was less likely
to be dictated to on the pace and scope of political change in
Singapore. In accommodating this nascent desire for a more
competitive political landscape, then Deputy Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong emphasized that the provision of guaranteed
legislative seats for the opposition results in "more opportunities
for political participation and to evolve a more consensual style of
government where alternative views are heard and constructive
dissent accommodated." 4 2 With more elected non-government and
opposition parliamentarians, a side narrative of trade-offs in which
Parliament is more fractious, contentious, and slower to make
decisions is put forth at the same time.
B. THE GROUP REPRESENTATION
CONSTITUENCYINNOVA TION
The Singapore government treats race, language, and religion
as fault lines in Singaporean society. Under Singapore's rigid,
largely state-assigned Chinese-Malay-Indian-Others (CMIO)
racial classification, every Singaporean is racially designated at
birth, based on one's patrilineality. 43 This definitive racial identity
41 Li-ann Thio, The Right to Political Participation in Singapore: Tailor-making
a Westminster-Modelled Constitution to Fit the Imperatives of 'Asian'
Democracy, 6 SING. J. INT'L & CoMp. L., no.1, at 181 (2002).
42 54 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES SINGAPORE, Col. 695 (Nov. 29, 1989).
4 On the CMIO classification, see Sharon Siddique, Singaporean Identity, in
MANAGEMENT OF SUCCESS: THE MOULDING OF MODERN SINGAPORE 563-577
(Kernial Singh Sandhu & Paul Wheatley eds., 1989). Limited racial self-
definition, through 'double-barreled race options,' was permitted recently. See
Press Release, Singapore's Immiigration and Checkpoints Authority, Greater
Flexibility with Implementation of Double-Barreled Race Option from 1
January 2011 (Dec. 29, 2010), available at http://www.ica.gov.sg/newsdetails.
aspx?nid=12443. For relevant Government policies and the collection of
statistics, the first component of a double-barreled race will be used. For
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is used for a variety of purposes including the choice of mother
tongue language instruction in schools, ethnic quotas in public
housing,44 opportunities within military service (whether conscript
or professional), and eligibility to contest as a Malay, Indian or
45
other minority candidate in parliamentary elections.
Proponents of electoral integration champion an electoral
system that generates inducements for moderate behavior and
crosscutting loyalties. First implemented in the 1988 general
elections, the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) electoral
system is a significant departure from the classic simple plurality
electoral system that was the hallmark of Singapore's Westminster
form of government. It was Singapore's sui generis attempt at
sustaining multiracialism through electoral integration. The GRC
was created "to ensure the representation in Parliament of
Members from the Malay, Indian and other minority
communities."47 Unsurprisingly, critics regard the GRC scheme as
example, a person who is classified as Chinese-Malay will be treated as
Chinese for relevant official purposes and data gathering.
4On the Ethnic Integration Policy, see Hoong Sin Chih, The Politics of Ethnic
Integration in Singapore: Malay 'Regrouping' as an Ideological Construct, 27
INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES., no. 3, at 527 (2003); Hoong Sin Chih, The
Quest for a Balanced Ethnic Mix: Singapore's Ethnic Quota Policy Examined,
39 URB3. STUD., no. 8, at 1347 (2002); Hoong Sin Chih, The Limits to
Government Intervention in Fostering an Ethnically Integrated Community -A
Singapore Case Study, 37 COMMUNITY DEV. J., no. 3, at 220 (2002).
4 Under the Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA), section 27, the Presidential
Council of Minority Rights would establish the Malay Community Committee,
and the Indian and Other Minority Communities Committee, at every election
to determine whether a minority candidate in a GRC team is indeed Malay,
Indian, or other racial minority. Section 27A(8) of the PEA enlarges the pool of
eligible minority candidates: a person belonging to the Malay community is
"any person, whether of the Malay race or otherwise, who considers himself to
be a member of the Malay community and who is generally accepted as a
member of the Malay community by that community." Similar provisions are
prescribed for persons of Indian origin and any other minority community.
4 DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); Donald L.
Horowitz, Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers 14 J. DEMOCRACY,
no. 4, at 115 (2003). To secure as many votes as possible to win, politicians
need to reach out and establish a broad-base appeal that transcends ethnic lines.
Thus, the policy prescription is to 'engineer' a system of healthy political
competition that facilitates the development of cross-cutting cleavages and
encourages inter-ethnic cooperation while making racial chauvinism and
extremism politically counter-productive. This approach lends critical support
to and emphasizes the virtues of moderation, racial non-partisanship, and the
development of inter-ethnic trust and cooperation.
Singapore Constitution, 1999 Reprint ed., art. 39A(1).
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a shrewd, if not blatant, attempt to stem the PAP's electoral
decline and perpetuate its electoral dominance.
The PAP government has consistently argued that the GRC
system ensures that the needs, concerns, and views of minority
races are not ignored or neglected in an ethnic Chinese-dominant
Singapore. The government claimed that the electorate, especially
the young voters, had a tendency to vote along racial lines,
"preferring candidates who were best suited to their own needs
without being sufficiently aware of the need to return a racially
balanced slate of candidates." 49 This supposed racial bias in the
electoral process would particularly threaten the representation of
the ethnic Malay community, the most significant minority race
community.o
In January 1988, at the introduction of the GRC proposal,
then First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong disclosed that
then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and he had first discussed the
need to secure a multi-racial Parliament in July 1982. The voting
trend, if it continued, would result in the under-representation of
Malays in Parliament. Prime Minister Lee had proposed a 'twin
constituencies' solution wherein two single-member
constituencies would be 'twinned,' and where one of the two
48 Li-anm Thio, Lex rex or rex lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule ofLaw in
Singapore, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2002); Li-anm Thio, supra note 41; Li-
ann Thio, Choosing Representatives: Singapore Does it Her way, in THE
PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 38-
58 (Graham Hassall & Cheryl Saunders eds., 1997); Rieger, supra note 9, at
242; Jinshan Li & Jorge Elklit, The Singapore General Election 1997
Campaigning Strategy, Results, and Analysis, 18 ELECTORAL STUD., no. 2, at
199 (1999).
9 50 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, Col. 180 (Jan. 11, 1988). As voting
is secret and no opinion polls allowed during the hustings, it is unclear how the
PAP government arrived at its conclusions on Singaporeans' voting behavior.
Section 78D, Parliamentary Elections Act also prohibits exit polls on polling
day.
0 The Malays, which comprise about 14 per cent of the Singapore population,
are constitutionally recognized as the indigenous people of Singapore. Article
152 of the Singapore Constitution states that
(1) It shall be the responsibility of the Government constantly to
care for the interests of the racial and religious minorities in
Singapore.
(2) The Government shall exercise its functions in such manner as
to recognize the special position of the Malays, who are the
indigenous people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall be the
responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard, support,
foster and promote their political, educational, religious,
economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language.
Besides the 'special position' of the Malays, Article 153A(2) of the
Constitution provides for Malay as the national language of Singapore.
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candidates must be Malay. This did not find support among the
PAP Malay MPs who were concerned that a minority race
candidate would be perceived to have 'leaned on' a Chinese
candidate to get elected. However, with the PAP suffering
significant electoral setbacks in the 1984 election, the PAP's
minority MPs agreed to the GRC proposal to ensure that minority
race candidates, especially first-time Malay candidates, would be
elected in future elections in adequate numbers. First Deputy
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explained in Parliament:
... It is make-belief to pretend that race and language
do not affect voter preferences.... Paradoxical as it may
seem, to ensure that multi-racialism succeeds in
Singapore, we have to openly recognize that race does
play a part in politics.... Loyalty to one's own
community, to race, to one's religion and language is
stronger than loyalty to the nation, particularly if that
nation is a new one and has many races.... [I]t is wise
of us to strengthen the political framework before it is
weakened by disillusionment, despondency and despair
when one community finds itself thrown out of
Parliament by the electoral system. 5'
Under the GRC scheme, voters elect in an enlarged electoral
district, on a 'one person, one vote' basis, a team of Members of
Parliament (MPs) rather than an individual MP. A political party
contesting in a GRC has to field a multi-member team of which at
least one member must be from a designated minority race. To
ensure adequate Malay parliamentary representation, three-fifths
of the total number of GRCs are designated constituencies where
at least one of the candidates in every group shall be a person
belonging to the Malay community. 52
Oddly enough, the GRC concept did not start off with
political representation or electoral integration as its core objective
when it was first raised publicly in January 1987. Once popularly
known as the 'Team MPs scheme,' the concept was initially
geared towards administrative and quasi-political decentralization
with the establishment of a form of local government known as
Town Councils. Led by their elected MPs, Town Councils are
51 50 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, Cols. 183-190 (Jan. 11, 1988).
52 Section 8A(3) read with section 8(1)(b)(i) of the Parliamentary Elections Act.
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responsible for the daily running of the public housing estates and
estate improvement. These important roles were previously
handled by the government's housing agency, the Housing and
Development Board (HDB). By making the voters' ballots bear an
intimate nexus with the well-being and market value of their
public housing estates, the Team MPs' proposal was intended to
concentrate the electorate's minds, when voting, on which party
would best meet their material concerns. As the PAP had an
impressive record in delivering rapid and shared economic growth
and had always staked its claim to fielding the superior candidates,
the Team MPs concept was expected to stem the PAP's declining
electoral support as the GRC scheme posed relatively high
"barriers to entry" to the opposition parties. 53
The original rationale for the Team MPs idea, however, was
not well received by the public. According to Jon Quah, this
"forced the PAP government to subsequently reveal its real,
though unstated, goal" of entrenching multiracialism in the
legislative process. 4 However, given the virtues of the GRC, it is
highly unlikely that the PAP government had to conceal the
scheme's real objective in the first place. Rather, the poor
reception to the Team MPs was over concerns that it was a hidden
attempt to promote the PAP's political stranglehold on power. A
radically different tack was in order to make the major
constitutional re-design palatable to the electorate, who were by
then increasingly dissatisfied with the PAP's lack of sensitivity to
the people's concerns. The objective of electoral integration was
subsequently and strategically added about a year after the Team
MPs' concept was first unveiled. Quite evidently, the sudden shift
in the policy rationale of the Team MPs' scheme suggests that
political instrumentalism was an undercurrent at work.
Given the significance of the proposed amendments, the GRC
proposal was referred by Parliament to a parliamentary select
committee. Based on the public submissions, the select committee
found widespread support for the GRC concept, especially from
the minority communities. 5 At the third reading of the Bill, First
Deputy Prime Minister Goh remarked that:
53 The PAP did not lose a GRC candidacy until the 2011 general election.
54 Jon S.T. Quah, Singapore: Meritocratic City-State, in GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 289, 299-300 (John Funston ed., 2001).
* See further Report of the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Elections
(Amendment) Bill (Bill No. 23/87).
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[Our Team MP concept] is benevolent. The
constitutional change is initiated by the majority to
directly benefit the minority communities without any
direct benefit to itself. ... On its own, it [the GRC] will
not ensure success in building up or strengthening our
multi-racial society. It is a formal institutional
arrangement. For us to succeed, we must have the same
spirit as the Swiss to search for consensus, to work
through informal as much as formal arrangements, to
make every citizen, whichever community, he belongs
to, feel that he is a Singaporean.
Given the GRC's electoral bias in favor of the minorities,
Parliament was careful to provide for Article 39A(3) of the
Constitution, which states that laws relating to the GRC scheme
are valid despite their being inconsistent with the equal protection
clause under Article 12 of the Constitution ' or be considered a
"differentiating measure" under Article 68.
The GRC has significantly transformed Singapore's electoral
landscape. In its idealized conception, the political parties
competing in a GRC have to portray a multi-racial orientation that
appeals to the ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese voters alike in
order to secure as many votes as possible. Taking an overtly racial
line would risk alienating segments of the electorate. The GRC
scheme can actualize moderation in electoral politics. While the
GRC scheme ensures that there will be adequate parliamentary
minority representation, it may well "institutionalize and rigidify
divisions that have no substantive purpose other than formalizing
consciousness of 'difference' . While the constitutional intent
56 50 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, Cols. 27 & 53 (May 18, 1988).
5 Notwithstanding Article 39(A)(3), the potential inconsistency with Article 12's
equal protection clause arises on two counts: (1) the GRC 'prefers' minority
races by giving them a designated number of parliamentary seats; and (2) a vote
cast in a GRC is 'worth more' than a SMC vote as the GRC places between
four to six MPs while the latter places only one MP (see also Li-ann Thio,
supra note 48).
Article 68 of the Singapore Constitution provides that a differentiating measure
is "any measure which is, or is likely in its practical application to be,
disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community and not
equally disadvantageous to persons of other such communities, either directly
by prejudicing persons of that community or indirectly by giving advantage to
persons of another community."
Graham Hassall, Systems of Representation in Asia-Pacific: A Comparative
Analysis, in THE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN THE
ASIA-PACiFIC REGION 16 (Graham Hassall & Cheryl Saunders eds., 1997).
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behind the GRC is praise-worthy, the manner in which the ruling
party has sought to capitalize on the GRC scheme to maintain its
political dominance was not. In particular, the PAP's approach can
reinforce the perceived subordinate role of the minority races in
60the electoral process.
First, in its quest for a decisive and overwhelming electoral
victory, the PAP's robust electoral approach tends to relegate the
GRC's multi-racial intent to a subordinate status. For instance, the
PAP's electoral strategy has been to have each GRC team headed
by a Cabinet minister. The PAP presents the electoral defeat of
any PAP GRC team not only as a loss for the PAP but one where
the country loses the services of a (valuable) minister. Another
strategy is to field new (and/or 'weaker') PAP candidates in teams
led by stronger and more established colleagues in order to ensure
the former's election.6 1 Prior to the 2011 general election, the last
time the PAP fielded a woman candidate or a minority candidate
in a single-member constituency (SMC) was in the 1991 general
election.
Secondly, the GRC scheme has expanded dramatically since
1988 resulting in the adulteration of its core function. This
expansion had taken place along two fronts: The doubling in the
maximum size of a GRC team, and the significant increase in the
proportion of GRC parliamentary seats. hi 1988, each GRC team
comprised three MPs, and just below half of all parliamentary
seats were for the GRCs. By 1997, the size of a GRC team had
increased to either five or six MPs, and the GRCs constituted
almost 90 per cent of parliamentary seats.62 Table 2 shows the
rapid pace at which GRCs became the majority of elected
parliamentary seats.
60 See Eugene K.B. Tan, Multiracialism Engineered. The Limits ofElectoral and
Spatial Integration in Singapore, 4 ETHNOPOLITICS, no. 4, at 413 (2005).
61 See also Li-ann Thio, supra note 48, at 202-03; Li-ann Thio, supra note 41.
62 Section 8A(1A) of the Parliamentary Elections Act mandates a minimum of
eight SMCs.
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Table 2: Distribution of SMC and GRC Parliamentary Seats, 1988 - 2011
Date of- Total No. of No. of SMC( No, of GR( Mae-up of GR M /
Genra ariaeta Set ( ) Sat1 Average, No. oIf M11s
Elctionl Sealts c1, s~ inl echI GRC
3 Sep 1988 81 42 (51.9) 39 (48.1) memern GRCs 30
31 Aug 1991 81 21(25.9) 60 (74.1) Fifteen GRCs: 4-
member GRCs /4.0
Fifteen GRCs: five 4-
2 Jan 1997 83 9 (10.8) 74 (89.2) member, six 5-
member, and four 6-
member / 4.93
Fourteen GRCs: nine
3 Nov 2001 84 9 (10.7) 75 (89.3) 5-member & five 6-
member / 5.38
Fourteen GRCs: nine
6 May 2006 84 9 (10.7) 75 (89.3) 5-member & five 6-
member / 5.38
Fifteen GRCs: two 4-
7 May 2011 87 12 (13.8) 75 (86.2) memb even 5-
two 6-member/ 5.0
Source: Author's compilation based on information available at the Singapore
Elections Department web site
The GRC scheme's enlargement has worked to the PAP's
advantage as the opposition parties have had immense difficulties
fielding GRC teams. This enlargement of the GRC scheme,
however, did not find its inspiration in the furtherance of the
multi-racialism ideal. Rather, the enlargement rationale was driven
by the desire to harness economies of scale by consolidating
housing estate operations through larger Town Councils. 63
Furthermore, the enlargement of the GRC scheme was more
beneficial to the PAP electorally.
In short, the constitutional imperative and rationale of
minority representation are poorly imprinted in the electoral
process and on the electorate. Consequently, the raison d'Otre of
multi-racialism forms, if at all, only a small part of the electorate's
decision-making process. Hence, the election of minority
candidates becomes an incidental and procedural effect, rather
than a motivation. The situation is compounded by the PAP
offering material incentives, such as preferential access to
63 For details, see Eugene K.B. Tan, supra note 60.64 See generally Netina Tan, Manipulating Electoral Laws in Singapore, 32
ELECTORAL STUDIES, no. 4, at 632 (2013).
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subsidized upgrading (extensive facelift and renovations) of public
housing precincts if they voted the PAP teams into office. 65
Notwithstanding the government's portrayal of the over-arching
rationale for the NCMP, NMP, and GRC innovations as political
changes for the greater good, the reality is that the changes,
including the 2010 amendments, have not been disadvantageous to
the ruling PAP in any significant way.
C 2010 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS:
PLUS (A CHANGE? 66
The 2010 constitutional amendments and electoral changes
announced were aimed at refreshing the NCMP, NMP and GRC
schemes. For the NCMP scheme, the Constitution was amended to
provide two changes. The first was to increase the maximum
number of NCMPs "declared to be elected" after a general
election from six to nine. With the increase to the constitutionally-
mandated minimum of nine opposition MPs, inclusive of NCMPs,
the minimum number of nine opposition MPs is now fixed and is
equal to the number of NMPs. Where opposition candidates are
elected in a general election, the number of NCMPs declared
elected is determined by the formula of '9 minus x,' where x is the
total number of opposition candidates elected to Parliament. The
second change was to fix the upper limit of NCMPs declared to be
elected instead of it being a variable number. Before the 2010
amendments, the Parliamentary Elections Act prescribed a
minimum of three opposition members in Parliament, although the
65 All things being equal, a precinct with popular support for the PAP had priority
in the disbursements of such upgrading benefits. Conversely, voters were
'cautioned' with the denial of upgrading benefits should electoral support for
the PAP was not forthcoming. This abiding concern of voters over their
housing estates becoming decrepit due to the lack of upgrading, arguably, had
an electoral impact. See further John Guh-sheng Hsieh & David Newman,
Elections in the Asia-Pacific: A Decade of Change, in How ASIA VOTES 81-102
(John Fuh-sheng Hsieh & David Newman eds., 2002); James Chin, Anti-
Christian Chinese Chauvinists and HDB Upgrades: The 1997 Singapore
General Election, 5 SOUTu EAST ASIA RES., no. 3, at 217 (1997). The HDB's
upgrading program and the politicization of public housing, generally, are
succinctly discussed in BENG-HUAT CHUA, POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND
HOUSING: STAKEHOLDING IN SINGAPORE 124-51 (1997).
66 The epigram's full expression is "plus Ca change, plus c'est la mme chose"
which is loosely translated as "the more things change, the more they remain
the same."
67 In addition, the 2010 amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act stipulate
a cap of two NCMPs from any one GRC.
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President could specify a higher number, up to six, before
Nomination Day.
In outlining his government's plans to tweak the NCMP
scheme, Prime Minister Lee noted that the NCMP scheme had
enabled Singaporeans to compare the policies and programs of the
government and the opposition, and for Singaporeans to evaluate
the performance of parties and MPs through parliamentary work,
and not just during the short general election campaign. The 2010
changes mean that whatever the general election outcome, elected
opposition members and non-constituency members, would form
about one-tenth of all members of Parliament.6 9
When Parliament passed the NMP scheme in 1990, the
govemiment had provided for a sunset clause in the legislative
provisions. This was in recognition of the deep concerns over the
legitimacy of appointed MPs who did not contest in an election.
Each new Parliament had to decide whether it wanted to have
NMPs. With the institutionalization of the NMP scheme in 2010,
Parliament now no longer have to decide whether to have NMPs.
The Prime Minister observed that the NMP scheme had worked
well and that it should be a permanent part of the political system.
The government also announced that it would broaden the scope
of unelected representation of the various functional groups in
Parliament. Besides nominations from the public in general, the
special select committee also formally invites nominations from
six functional groups - business and industry, the professions, the
labor movement, social and community organizations, media, arts
and sports, and tertiary education institutions. The 2010
amendments provided for an additional functional group, the
people sector or civil society. Prime Minister Lee said that, "This
68 The President would have gazetted, before Nomination Day, the number of
NCMPs (a minimum of three to a maximum of six) in the next Parliament.
However, this was never done in practice and the default position was a
minimum of three opposition MPs (whether elected and/or unelected). Thus,
prior to the 2010 amendments, if fewer than three opposition candidates were
returned as elected MPs, then there could be one, or two, or three NCMPs
depending on the number of elected opposition MPs, using the formula of '3
minus x' (x being the number elected opposition MPs). For example, if two
opposition candidates were elected, then there would be one NCMP, whereas if
three opposition candidates were elected, there would be no NCMPs.
69 In the current twelfth Parliament (as at Nov. 1, 2013), there are 99 MPs,
comprising 87 elected MPs, 9 NMPs, and 3 NCMPs. Of the 87 elected MPs, 7
are from the opposition, all from the Workers' Party. Assuming there were no
opposition candidates elected at a general election, there would be, guaranteed,
nine NCMPs (9 minus 0). As six opposition MPs were elected at the May 2011
general election, three NCMPs were declared elected (9 minus 6).
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will give civil society a voice in Parliament and encourage civil
society to grow and to mature further." These changes to the GRC
scheme were not substantial and did not require any amendment to
the Constitution or other legislation.
Typically, MPs in a GRC will carve out divisions within a
GRC among themselves. Each MP will focus on looking after his
own division in the GRC. Consequently, MPs in a GRC are less
likely to know the voters in the other divisions, resulting in voters
finding it harder to identify with the enlarged electoral district, or
with the other MPs of the GRC. The proposed change was
ostensibly motivated by the imperative to strengthen the link
between voters and their MPs as well as having electoral
candidates and their political parties provide voters with a strong
incentive to vote for them. To this end, the Prime Minister sought
to impress upon voters to cast their ballots on the basis of which
candidates and political parties would do the best job in three areas
viz looking after the constituents' interests, representing them in
Parliament, and ultimately forming the government to run the
country. The Prime Minister indicated that there would be smaller
GRCs and fewer six-member ones, resulting in the average
national GRC size becoming smaller. To effect the change, the
Prime Minister merely needs to specify in the Electoral
Boundaries Review Committee's (EBRC) terms of reference that
there would be fewer six-member GRCs, and that the average size
of a GRC should not exceed five members.70
In ringing the changes to the GRC, the Prime Minister did
note the advantages of having bigger rather than smaller GRCs,
reiterating the themes of multi-racialism, the administration of
Town Councils, the GRCs' higher barriers to election, and the gap
between the ruling party and the opposition:
They enable stronger multiracial teams to be formed
which include MPs who have different backgrounds
and skills, who can serve voters more comprehensively
and effectively.... Bigger GRCs also require any
challenger to field a strong team and offer a serious
alternative to have a chance to win. Therefore, bigger
GRCs encourage responsible and credible Opposition
parties to emerge.
This was the case in the May 2011 general election. See also Table 2.
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Even as the changes were proposed, the PAP government
emphasized the imperative of responsible and credible opposition
parties. The subtext was that, in the absence of credible
alternatives, the PAP was the obvious choice for voters given its
track record.
For the PAP government, a general election is not simply
about choosing one's representatives in the legislature. Instead, the
political behavior sought to be promoted by the PAP government
among the voters is to regard a general election as a serious
political act that is, ultimately, about electing the government of
the day. The PAP has urged voters to provide the winning political
party with a strong parliamentary majority, and with that a clear
mandate to govem decisively.
V. DRIVERS OF CHANGE
The series of constitutional changes since the 1980s were
extensive. Future changes are likely to be incremental unless the
political situation undergoes a sea change. A key theme of changes
in the 1980s and 2010 is the emphasis on opposition parties
needing to measure up to the dominant PAP. The changes also can
be seen as concerted attempts to raise the electoral bar while the
ruling PAP is still able to effect and implement the necessary
constitutional and other legislative changes. The PAP sees itself as
the only party deserving to govern Singapore. In that light, the
various changes discussed in this article seek to ensure that the
PAP remains in a pivotal position electorally even as it continues
to impress upon voters, especially those born post-independence,
the criticality of Singapore having a responsible and credible
government with a strong electoral mandate. Put plainly, for the
PAP, elections must not only be about electing MPs to serve the
voters' interests. Equally important, if not more important, is for a
general election to serve the national interest by putting in power
the government of the day with a strong mandate. For the PAP
government, this is the main consideration for voters going to the
polls.
What was the impetus for this set of changes over an
extended period of time, which is certainly still a work in
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progress?7 The most extensive amendments to the legislative and
electoral system took place in a relatively short span of time
between 1984 and 1990, with the 2010 changes being more tweaks
rather than innovations. To be politically dominant in a more
competitive electoral landscape, the ruling PAP has to ensure that
the political system remains relevant and caters to the growing
democratic aspirations. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong indicated
as much, saying that "as Singapore society continues to evolve, so
too must our democratic institutions." He noted that Singaporeans,
increasingly, want national issues to be more fully debated and to
play a part in improving policy formulation. He added that:
[m]ost importantly, changes like these will keep
Parliament in sync with the concerns and aspirations of
Singaporeans, and strengthen the role of Parliament as
the key democratic institution where important national
issues are deliberated and decided.7 2
Even as the Prime Minister emphasized the strengthening of
Parliament's role as a key democratic institution, he reiterated the
need "to make the changes carefully" and to proceed
pragmatically:
71 For instance, selected constitutional provisions relating to the elected
Presidency such as Article 5(2A), which entrenches this change, are not yet in
operation although enacted twenty-two years ago in 1991. In response to a
parliamentary question in February 2007 as to whether Article 5(2A) of the
Constitution will be brought into operation soon, the Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Law replied that:
... we are not ready to bring Article 5(2A) into operation soon. This
is because we are still refining the Presidential safeguards,
especially in regard to the country's reserves. This is a gradual
process that requires time. Sir, when we enacted the provisions in
our Constitution for an elected Presidency, we were conscious that
those changes were unique and unparalleled elsewhere. Our clear
and stated intention was to refine the scheme and to iron out all the
issues that may arise in the light of experience over time, before
bringing the entrenchment provisions into operation. As Members
know, we have previously made amendments to refine the
framework to deal with issues that had not really been anticipated.
See 82 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, Col. 1238 (Feb. 12, 2007). This
means that most constitutional provisions, including those on the elected
Presidency and fundamental liberties, can be amended by a two-thirds majority
of votes (excluding NCMPs and NMPs) in Parliament. This is not an issue for
the PAP govermnent since it holds eighty of the eighty-seven elected seats.
7286 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENT REPORTS, Col. 515 (May 27, 2009).
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Our goal is to improve on a system which is already
working but can still be improved. We must not
jettison the lessons that we have leamt at great cost
through our political history and experience over the
last half century, as to what really works for
Singapore. Nor should we create a system which
inadvertently produces weak governments, just to
placate those who desire a stronger opposition in
Parliament. Singapore has to have a strong and
capable government, with a clear mandate from the
people and the ability to act decisively to protect and
advance our interests. We cannot afford a government
that is ineffective, indecisive, or paralyzed by internal
divisions. We are seeking a system that works well for
Singaporeans, and that will deliver good governance,
and strong and competent leadership. We are not
looking for a system which sounds good in theory, but
is unsuited to our conditions and unworkable in
practice. This approach, this sort of system, is what
marks us as different from many other countries.7 3
Congruent with this approach and outlook to institutional
design, the PAP government seeks to manage the pace of political
change. In this regard, it attempts to calibrate adroitly the changes
while also seeking to influence and mold Singaporeans' political
attitudes towards elections as the key vehicle by which a strong
government is emplaced. Unsurprisingly, the government stated
that the changes to the NCMP, NMP and GRC schemes would
result in "a more balanced electoral system." Noting the increase
to at least eighteen members of parliament (or just below one-fifth
of the House, comprising of at least nine opposition MPs and nine
NMPs) who would not be from the ruling party, the Prime
Minister predicted that the change in the composition of
Parliament would "affect the dynamics of the House, between the
Government and the opposition parties." Yet, even in a deliberate
and relatively more contentious accented legislative set-up, the
Prime Minister cautioned the opposition MPs to "uphold the
political system and the institutions of our democracy and [to
remember that] their loyalty must be to Singapore." In short,
73 86 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENT REPORTS, Cols. 515-516 (May 27, 2009) (emphasis
added).
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political parties are expected to work within the status quo even as
the PAP asserts that it always does right for the people and the
Singaporean nation-state.
The changes demonstrate the saliency of two key features of
Singapore's political system. The first is to retain Parliament as
the focal point of the political system. This means that elections
are the primary mode of political contestation at regular intervals,
with Parliament being the main platform for political contestation
between elections. The second and more significant feature is the
political elites' belief that constitutional design must produce a
government with a clear mandate to govern. This is aided by a
simple plurality electoral system of 'one voter, one vote' in both
single-member and multi-member districts. With the simple
plurality electoral system, whether an electoral candidate wins by
a single ballot or with 99.9 per cent of the votes, the winner takes
the seat (in the case of a GRC, the winner takes all the seats). As
such, two-thirds of the national popular vote has given the PAP at
least 93 per cent of parliamentary seats since 1968.
The Prime Minister asserted that the changes do not
"entrench any one party, nor ... deliberately result in weakened
governments." Instead, they seek to 'update' Singapore's
political system to better reflect the aspirations of Singaporeans by
providing an "adequate voice for diverse views in Parliament,
including non-partisan views and those who have voted for the
Opposition." This has been the consistent theme that ostensibly
undergirds the innovations since the 1980s. Nonetheless, such a
framework would also facilitate the elected government garnering
a clear mandate to govern. The 2010 changes did not detract from
this central political organizing principle and preference of a clear
mandate to govern. The changes maintained the simple plurality
electoral system, which tends to deliver decisive electoral
outcomes when compared with other electoral systems such as
proportional representation. Prime Minister Lee noted that the
first-past-the-post system "tends to produce decisive majorities
and enables the winning party to govern effectively."
While Prime Minister Lee acknowledged that the
proportional representation (PR) system would "certainly increase
representation of alternate views and opposition parties in
74 All other remarks by Prime Minister Lee in this section are taken from his
speech on the state of Singapore politics during the debate on the President's
Address (see 86 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENT REPORTS, Cols. 513-527, (May 27,
2009).
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Parliament," he opined that "PR systems tend to produce weak
governments, based on shifting coalitions of different parties."
Relying on the fact of Singapore's multi-racial, multi-religious
composition, Prime Minister Lee argued that while PR systems
may work for homogenous societies, the likelihood in Singapore is
weak coalition governments, "with small extremist parties
wielding a disproportionate influence on the policy of the
government, because the government needs the minority partner."
Indeed, the Prime Minister asserted that "proportional
representation would ruin" Singapore as:
PR will encourage parties to form based on race and
religion or, for that matter, based on cause-related
issues, to push stridently for the narrow interests of
their group, at the expense of other groups, and this
would polarize and divide our society.
On the timing of the changes, the Prime Minister said he was
initiating the changes "so that we can discuss and settle this in a
calm atmosphere and make the amendments in ample time before
the next election," adding that these changes were for the long-
term strength and stability of the system.75
Much room has been accorded to the Prime Minister's
explanation and justification for the 2010 constitutional changes.
They provide valuable insights into the political elites' thinking on
institutional design in Singapore. In Singapore's context, a
dominant narrative is that the autochthonous political system
works well. Political stability has enabled rapid and shared
economic prosperity. This has been a rich source of political
legitimacy for the PAP government. This functional approach,
however, may not appeal to the younger voters to whom the
PAP's 'Third World to First World in One Generation' success
story has limited traction. What is evident from the foregoing
explanation is how the extended series of constitutional changes
reinforce the long-standing discourse of 'right-sizing' the political
system to ensure that it is designed to meet the needs and
challenges, as conceived by the ruling elites, for good governance.
7 The 2011 general election was called slightly more than a year after the
constitutional and legislative amendments were passed. Although the PAP was
returned to power with eighty-one of the eighty-seven elected seats, it garnered
its lowest share of the total valid votes cast, including losing a GRC for the first
time.
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In this regard, the emphasis is on stability, effectiveness and
efficacy of the electoral and political system. The criterion is
whether the political system is fit for purpose, not whether it meets
some ideological requirements.
While representation is given tacit recognition, it does not yet
function as a definitive, foundational idea of political life in
Singapore. The changes discussed underscore this. Representation
is not sought for representation's sake. Political representation in
Singapore is not ideologically driven. Hence, representation
functions more as a means to the end of effective and competent
governance. However, representation is, at its core, about
enfranchisement. For laws and national policies to retain their
legitimacy, Parliament - as the ultimate law-making institution
- has to be the key platform for the articulation and debate of
diverse views. As such, proportional representation can go some
way towards addressing such issues. The PAP government tends
to mischaracterize PR systems as being divisive for encouraging
voting along racial lines. Properly designed, PR systems need
not trigger racial responses nor should they invariably deliver
racial outcomes or accentuate racial differences.
Furthermore, voting along racial lines while possible is not a
feasible electoral strategy in Singapore. The electoral system
makes it difficult for voters, except perhaps for the ethnic Chinese
majority, to vote along racial lines for political ends. 7 9 Given the
unequivocal rejection of racial politics (and the racializing of
political issues) in Singapore, proportional representation is
unlikely to result in voters casting their ballots along racial lines.
There are no political parties, save for one, organized along racial
lines.
The PAP's wariness with proportional representation is not
due to concerns of racial politics. Its real concern is fundamentally
about the PAP's long-standing systemic abhorrence of a weak
76 Cf PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, SMALL STATES IN THE WORLD MARKETS:
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN EUROPE (1985); Ronald Rogowski, Trade and the
Variety of Democratic Institutions, 41 INT' L ORG., no. 2, at 203 (1987).
Katzenstein and Rogowski argue that proportional representation is more likely
in small, trade-dependent countries, given the greater need for political
compromise and democratic participation. Singapore's external trade volume is
almost four times its gross domestic product.
7 See Tan, supra note 60.
There is no reason why a creative institutional design for PR cannot be done,
especially if the intent is to ensure political equity based on electoral results and
that the political system reflect popular will.
See Tan, supra note 60.
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government, where the government is without a firm majority of
seats. For the PAP, a PR electoral system is closely identified with
a weak government. This makes proportional representation a non-
starter for the PAP government. Proportional representation is
seen as being detrimental to the strong governance that the
political elites regard as being essential in Singapore. Whether the
electoral system is equitable and whether it delivers a
representative Parliament do not rank as major concerns for the
government. Concerns of equity and representativeness vis-a-vis
the electoral system and legislature are inadequately managed
through the NCMP and NMP schemes. The Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU), in its July 2013 Singapore country report,
observed that it was unlikely for "any notable changes" to the
electoral system in the near future. However, the EIU added that in
the long term:
... the mismatch between the PAP's continued
parliamentary dominance and its declining popular
support seems politically unsustainable. Every voting
system has its flaws and idiosyncrasies, but one in
which 40% of the population who voted for opposition
parties are represented by just six legislators seems
problematic. At the very least, such results lend support
to critics who argue that Singapore's political system is
designed to enable the ruling party to claim a
permanent electoral mandate rather than to reflect
popular will.so
This resistance to greater representation and equity in the
legislature may very well contribute to the disenfranchisement of
voters, resulting in their voting against the status quo. However,
true and purposeful representation can clothe political action with
legitimacy and catalyze political participation as the political
system is denominated and empowered by inclusiveness.
Enfranchisement can contribute to a sense of ownership of the
political institutions and processes. While the institutional design
has to integrate the various political imperatives,
representativeness can co-exist with effectiveness and efficacy.
80 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, SINGAPORE, COUNTRY REPORT 3 (JULY 2013).
The PAP subsequently lost two by-elections to the Workers' Party in May 2012
and January 2013. There were seven elected opposition MPs and three
unelected (opposition) NCMPs as of July 31, 2013.
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These attributes should not be seen to be competing or conflicting
but can be integrated in the institution design.
Without a doubt, the constitutional changes to Singapore's
political system over the past three decades reiterate and reinforce
the centrality of, and abiding concern with, a strong and effective
government. The innovations, however, do not go far enough.
Paradoxically, the desire for a strong government on the part of
the ruling elites may well result in representativeness,
inclusiveness, and equity in the political system being relegated to
secondary concerns. Consequently, the voters' sense of
disenfranchisement with the electoral and political system may
result in the lower likelihood of the general election delivering a
strong government that the PAP so desires. The Singapore case
study points to the ruling elites' abiding anxiety and prescient
recognition that the electoral system and political system have to
be refreshed to remain relevant, especially within the context of a
one-party dominant state. However, as argued here, institutional
design has to go beyond the quest for continued political control.
For laws and national policies to retain their legitimacy,
Parliament - as the ultimate law-making institution - must be a
genuine and key platform for the articulation and debate of diverse
views.
VI. CONCLUSION
The amendments to the Constitution and related legislation
between 1984 and 2010 are part of the larger endeavor to retain
Parliament's standing as the focal point of Singapore's political
life and governance. These changes are in sync with the PAP
government's efforts to develop a system of parliamentary
democracy that it deems best for Singapore. Political autochthony
is treated as a virtue and a norm in Singapore's political sphere
even as Singapore strategically clings on to the selective use of its
Westminster lineage. It complements the political imperative to
keep Singapore's brand of parliamentary democracy relevant and
legitimate notwithstanding the one party-dominant political
system.
However, political autochthony alone is insufficient given
that representation is a foundational idea of political life since
ancient times. By a small measure, the changes do enhance
Parliament's representativeness but only peripherally. The ruling
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PAP has won, on average, 65 per cent of the popular vote in the
seven general elections since 1984 when the Non-Constituency
Member of Parliament (NCMP) scheme was first introduced. Over
the years with a gradual politically maturing electorate, the
emphasis in tweaking the political system has shifted towards
privileging alternative and diverse views in Parliament, rather than
adversarial, partisan ones. The Singapore government is acutely
aware of the growing desire for a more open and vibrant political
system - one where the citizen's voice matters and where the
concern and interest with national matters is not the sole preserve
of politicians. This politics with a small 'p' for the masses is to be
distinguished from politics with a big 'P' which involves only a
select group of citizens partaking as politicians in the rough and
tumble of adversarial political contests. Further, there is a need to
deal with the perception that parliamentary sittings are PAP party
caucuses, wherein Parliament's ability to restrain the powerful
executive is doubted.
The constitutional changes reflect the steadfast belief that the
institutional design of Singapore's political system must produce a
government with a clear mandate, demonstrated through a strong
parliamentary majority. The institutional design is geared towards
the government of the day being able to govern resolutely and
decisively in the long-term interests of Singapore. While some
view the changes as conveying a political advantage to the PAP, it
is reasonable to say that, at the very least, they do not
disadvantage the ruling party. The changes are necessary, where
the PAP government is concerned, to avoid a freak election
outcome. Ironically, the so-called freak election outcome may
happen but it would then be aligned with what voters want. If the
desire grows for more non-PAP voices in Parliament -and not
merely to keep the PAP in check- more voters will consciously
cast their ballots for the opposition. If it results in a PAP loss, such
an outcome would no longer be a freak (unintended) election
outcome.
Will the recent legislative changes let Singaporeans have
their cake and eat it? That is, to continue to have the PAP
government returned to power with a decisive majority while also
having sufficient non-PAP representation in the legislature to keep
the government in check. With the provision for a 'cooling-off day'
in the 2010 amendments, Singaporeans are asked to vote in
accordance with their own long term interests without the heat and
passion of the hustings which runs high at the end of the nine-day
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campaign period, the minimum length permitted under
Singapore's election laws. Operating in the background is the
attempted institutional assurance that there will be at least eighteen
non-PAP parliamentarians in the legislature. However, as this
article has argued, this may be inadequate to manage the desire for
real and substantive opposition, and the inevitable movement
towards a weakening of the one-party dominant system.
The latest round of constitutional amendments continues the
theme and trend of adaptive exceptionalism in institutional design
in the political arena: Singapore doing things her way and
Singaporeans deciding their political fate. The PAP's political
hegemony and attempt to manage the pace of political change
notwithstanding, the touchstone challenge for sustainable
institutional design must be inclusiveness and representation in
tandem with Singaporeans' growing democratic aspirations,
increasing civic-political participation, and democratic ownership
of governmental processes.
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